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UNITED STATES V. NACCHIO AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN
EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT: PRACTICAL AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS OF AMENDING FINANCIAL GAIN AS A
MEASURE OF CULPABILITY
INTRODUCTION
Round two of United States v. Nacchio' before the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals found the defense team arguing that Joseph Nacchio,
former Chief Executive Officer of Qwest, Inc., was over-sentenced under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines due to incorrect calculation of finan-
cial gain-the lynchpin of his sentence determination. 2 Nacchio's sen-
tence was comprehensive: seventy-two months imprisonment for each of
nineteen counts of insider trading, two years of supervised release for
each count (both to run concurrently), and a fine of nineteen million dol-
lars.3 Fundamentally, the appeal was delicately hinged on an unconven-
tional theory: that criminal case law4 provided insufficient precedent for
the calculation of financial gain, so the court must consult civil law to
supplement its interpretation. 5 Finding for the petitioner-defendant, the
Tenth Circuit held that the district court had miscalculated gain for the
purpose of sentencing and ordered the lower court to apply a theory of
civil-remedy calculation to the case on remand.6 Thus, the decision in
Nacchio is at odds with an Eighth Circuit decision7 regarding interpreta-
tion of an infrequently-consulted and highly-technical area of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
In its relative naissance, the circuit split on the calculation of gain
for the sentencing of sophisticated-fraud offenders has flown under the
radar. In the years directly following the 1987 introduction of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 8 circuit courts appeared inundated by the more
litigated issue in economic crimes: the calculation of financial loss. 9
While the loss calculation prompted multiple circuit splits on the various
1. 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 2009).
2. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.4 (2008).
3. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1066. Mr. Nacchio was also sentenced to forfeit profits totaling
approximately $52 million dollars. Id. Though the Tenth Circuit also reversed on the issue of forfei-
ture of profits, the issue will not be considered in this article.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2005).
5. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 30, United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir.
2009) (No. 07-1311).
6. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1086.
7. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1101.
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2008).
9. Frank 0. Bowman, Il, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Anal-
ysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 26 (2001) [hereinafter Bowman, Sentencing Re-
forms].
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elements of the provision-ultimately, requiring the United States Sen-
tencing Commission to amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines-the
calculation of gain went unchallenged and remained relatively static.' 0
Today, in light of recent cases from both the Tenth and Eighth Circuits,
the proper calculation of gain is uncertain and poised for debate.
This Comment predicts the emerging circuit split over the calcula-
tion of gain for the sentencing of sophisticated-fraud offenders is an issue
unlikely to be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court because it is
the authorized area of the United States Sentencing Commission to ad-
dress circuit court splits on Federal Sentencing Guidelines interpretation
through amendment to the Guidelines.' Furthermore, this Comment
argues that while the net-gain approach to gain calculation established by
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Mooney tends to result in over-
sentencing, the alternative market-absorption approach based on the civil
remedy of disgorgement established by the Tenth Circuit in Nacchio
provides an unworkable and burdensome calculation methodology. By
paralleling the Commission's prior resolution of the practical problems
of the calculation of loss in similar economic crimes to the current issue
of gain calculation, and by considering the overriding philosophies driv-
ing criminal punishment, this Comment concludes that the ultimate reso-
lution of gain calculation for sentencing purposes demands a new hybrid-
calculation methodology established by amendment of the Sentencing
Guidelines.
Part I of this Comment reviews the structure of the federal sentenc-
ing process since the formation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in
1984, and focuses on the interrelated roles of appellate review and the
United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines amendment process.
Part II considers the consolidation of economic crimes through the Eco-
nomic Crime Package amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
in 2001 as the basis for paralleling the resolution of loss calculation to
the current issue of gain calculation. Part m details the emerging circuit
split on the calculation of gain by contrasting the legal theories and ana-
lyses presented in Mooney and Nacchio. Part IV first analyzes both the
net-gain and market-absorption approaches to financial-gain calculation
under the framework established by the 2001 amendment of loss calcula-
tion for similar economic crimes. This is accomplished by contrasting
each theory's approach to the practical application of definition, timing,
and causation. Second, Part V seeks to reconcile the two prevailing ap-
proaches of gain calculation with the underlying philosophies driving
federal sentencing policy and criminal punishment. Finally, Part IV pro-
poses an approach to amending gain as a measure of culpability for so-
1O. See id. at 26, 34; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend 617
(2008) Amendment 617 of the Sentencing Guidelines amended Chapter 2, Part B property crime
provisions of the 2000 Sentencing Guidelines.
ii. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1991).
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phisticated-fraud offenders. The Comment concludes that because nei-
ther approach meets both the practical and policy demands of federal
sentencing, the more judicious approach to the resolution of financial-
gain calculation methodology is for the United States Sentencing Com-
mission to amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to reflect a dis-
tinctly new calculation methodology.
I. STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING PROCESS
In 1984, Congress established the United States Sentencing Com-
mission ("Sentencing Commission" or "Commission") through the Sen-
tencing Reform Act. 12 The Commission was charged with reforming and
standardizing the federal sentencing process by promulgating federal
sentencing guidelines designed to make sentencing honest, uniform, and
proportionate in light of the criminal justice objectives of rehabilitation,
incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution.' 3 The product of the Commis-
sion's endeavors-the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing
Guidelines" or "Guidelines")-sought to achieve these goals by correlat-
ing the specific behavior involved in the offense to the characteristics of
the offender, including his or her criminal history. 14 On November 1,
1987, the Sentencing Guidelines took effect, "apply[ing] to all offenses
committed on or after that date."' 15 In standardizing the classification of
crimes into categories corresponding to sentencing calculation tables, the
Commission made uniformity an integral part of sentencing and put of-
fenders on notice of their ultimate sentence term.' 6 Incorporated
throughout the categories and tables was the overarching principle that
not all crimes require the same deterrent effect, nor do they all require
retribution to the same degree.1 7 In weighing the sentencing separately
for each crime, but restricting it to a sentencing range, the notion of pro-
portionality to the crime was affected without sacrificing uniformity
among offenders. 18
Though initially mandatory, the Sentencing Guidelines became ad-
visory in 2005 following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v.
Booker.'9 Booker held that a mandatory sentencing guideline system
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because
the sentencing process permitted consultation of facts not presented to
12. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006).
13. See id. § 991(b); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.3 (2008).
14. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.2 (2008).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 370-71 (2003).
18. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 6 (2006) [hereinafter BOOKER REPORT].
19. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-61, 264 (2005) (explaining the severance
and excision of two specific provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA2 (2008).
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the jury at trial.20 Nonetheless, Booker still requires judges to begin sen-
tencing determinations by looking first to the Guidelines and its accom-
panying policy statements. 2' Today, a sentencing court is required to
begin with the base offense level specified in the Sentencing Guide-
lines.22 This base offense level-an intersection of the offender's crimi-
nal history and the level designated for the offense in the relevant provi-
sion of the Sentencing Guidelines-anchors23 the sentencing determina-
tion by giving the court a point of departure.24 From there, the offense
level is adjusted upward or downward based on the specific characteris-
tics of the particular criminal conduct.25 The court arrives at a numeric
offense level which corresponds to a pre-determined sentencing range in
the sentencing table; the court retains discretion to deviate from that pre-
26determined range if it finds a departure is necessary.
Ensuring proper execution of the Sentencing Guidelines necessi-
tated a formal review process.27 According to the Sentencing Reform
Act, the purpose of providing for appellate review was to maintain accu-
racy in application of the Guidelines, ensure that disparity in sentencing
was reduced, provide a check to departure from Guidelines sentencing,
20. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (affirming the Court of Appeals holding that Booker's sen-
tence violated the Sixth Amendment); Daniel M. Levy, Defending Demnaree: The Ex Post Facto
Clause's Lack of Control Over the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2623, 2638 (2009).
21. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. Recent statistics indicate that post-Booker, the Guidelines still
play a significant role in federal sentencing: the rate of compliance with sentencing has remained
stable at 85.9 percent, only marginally lower than before the landmark case. BOOKER REPORT, supra
note 18, at 46. This is perhaps indicative of a general acceptance of the Sentencing Commission's
expertise in "articulat[ing] rules for nationwide application" better than any single judge. Nancy
Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART
137, 140 (2006), http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/2006/07/gertner.html. Thus, the Guidelines continue
to promote uniformity in sentencing, despite their advisory nature. Id.
22. See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 558 (1996).
23. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 138 ("Anchoring is a strategy used to simplify complex
tasks, in which 'numeric judgments are assimilated to a previously considered standard.' . . . In
effect, the 300-odd page Guideline Manual provides ready-made anchors.").
24. See id. at 140 ("[Appellate court cases] hold that deviation from Guideline ranges is rarely
appropriate and only for reasons that are based on the same faulty premises that under-girded the
mandatory regime. Appellate courts have insisted that district court judges begin with-effectively,
'anchor' their decisions- in the Guidelines before considering anything else.").
25. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 558.
26. Booker, 542 U.S. at 233-35 (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines have always permitted
discretionary departures from the sentencing range, but that these departures have not been available
in every case and, under the mandatory regime, were rare); see also id. at 246 (explaining that the
remedial majority devises the remedy of making the Sentencing Guidelines advisory while nonethe-
less preserving "a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender's real conduct-
a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress intended its Guide-
lines system to achieve"); BOOKER REPORT, supra note 18, at 20-21, 24. Though determination
within the sentencing range has always been at the court's discretion, post-Booker, the courts are
given more leeway to depart from the designated sentence range. Imposition of a sentence outside
the sentencing range is currently subject to appellate review for reasonableness. Id.
27. Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty: Appellate Review and the Sentencing Guide-
lines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 624 (1992); see also BOOKER REPORT, supra note 18, at 24 (stating
that the appellate court will not reach the question of the reasonableness of the sentence until it has
considered the lower court's calculation of a sentencing range).
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fine-tune application of provision language, and, finally, to develop a
common law to be used as precedent.2 8 Principally, the standard of re-
view for issues of Sentencing Guidelines interpretation and meaning is
de novo, and both the defendant and the State possess limited rights to
appeal sentencing. 29 The legislative benefit of appellate review of federal
sentencing has been that the appeals courts have discovered "technical
problems, minor inconsistencies, and other glitches in the drafting and
structure of the [G]uidelines.,, 30 The United States Supreme Court in
Braxton v. United States determined that Congress intended federal cir-
cuit court splits concerning interpretation of the Guidelines to be re-
solved by the Commission amending the Guidelines. 31 Hence, it is much
more likely the Sentencing Commission will resolve a circuit split on
interpretational dilemmas than the United States Supreme Court.32
In promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines and its amendments, the
Sentencing Commission aims "to solve both the practical and philoso-
phical problems of developing a coherent sentencing system." 33 The
practical problems of sentencing are the organization of crimes into cate-
gories and provisions, and the application of the technical terms of each
provision in sentencing determination. 34 By contrast, the philosophical
problems are much broader, encompassing the larger framework of goals
and purposes of criminal punishment.35 For gain as a measure of culpa-
bility, the Sentencing Commission must look first to the larger category
of economic crimes to provide a context for considering the necessary
changes to be made to the provision; then to the specific practical prob-
28. Zipperstein, supra note 27, at 624.
29. See id. at 625, 629.
30. Id. at 628.
31. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1991). The Braxton Court held:
A principal purpose for which we use our certiorari jurisdiction... is to resolve conflicts
among the United States courts of appeals and state courts concerning the meaning of
provisions of federal law .... Ordinarily, however, we regard the task as initially and
primarily ours.... The Guidelines are of course implemented by the courts, so in charg-
ing the Commission "periodically [to] review and revise" the Guidelines, Congress nec-
essarily contemplated that the Commission would periodically review the work of the
courts, and would make whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judi-
cial decisions might suggest. This congressional expectation alone might induce us to be
more restrained and circumspect in using our certiorari power as the primary means of re-
solving such conflicts ....
Id. (fourth alteration in original); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IAI.2 (2008).
Though the Sentencing Guidelines are a rigid document, they are by no means static; to the contrary,
upon their publication, the Commission emphasized that "the guideline-writing process" was "evolu-
tionary" and would necessitate amendment. Id. Amendment to the guidelines is a frequent occur-
rence: amendments are made annually through submission to Congress and "automatically take
effect 180 days after submission unless a law is enacted to the contrary." Id.
32. Douglas A. Berman, The Sentencing Commission as Guidelines Supreme Court: Respond-
ing to Circuit Conflicts, 7 FED. SENT'G. REP. 142, 142 (1994) (stating that "[w]hen an intercircuit
conflict concerns differences in interpretation of guidelines provisions that do not reach constitu-
tional issues, the Supreme Court has indicated that the Commission has the initial and primary task
of addressing and resolving the conflict" (citing 1993 U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, ANN. REP. 14 (1994))).
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lems of gain as a measure of culpability. Finally, the Commission must
ensure any amendment is consistent with the policy framework of the
Sentencing Guidelines and criminal punishment.
II. PARALLELING ECONOMIC CRIMES
Nearly a quarter of all federal convictions are for economic
crimes.36 Most white-collar crimes fall into the category of economic
crimes. 37 Originally, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines divided the great
variety of economic crimes into three broad categories: (1) section 2B I.
covered "Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Receiving,
Transporting, Transferring, Transmitting, or Possessing Stolen Prop-
erty"; 38 (2) section 2B1.3 covered "Property Damage or Destruction"';
39
and (3) section 2FI L1 acted as a catch-all to cover most economic crimes
not covered by the previous two sections, including "Fraud and Deceit,
Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other
than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the U.S." 4° Insider trading, con-
sidered a "sophisticated fraud" under Part F of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, was included in section 2F1.2.4'
A. The Convergence of Economic-Crime Offenses Under the Sentencing
Guidelines
In 2001, the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing
Guidelines' applicable economic crimes provisions through the Eco-
nomic Crime Package-a six-part amendment addressing practical prob-
lems.42 The reform reorganized the economic crimes sections by consoli-
dating sections 2B1.1, 2B1.3, and 2FI.I into section 2B1.1, labeled
"Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud ' 43 because the Commission con-
cluded that the distinction between theft and fraud was "largely illu-
sory,"44 and, thus, impractical. The significance of combining three sepa-
36. Frank 0. Bowman III, Coping With "Loss": A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal
Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 461 (1998) [hereinafter Bowman,
Coping with Loss].
37. Zvi D. Gabbay, Exploring the Limits of the Restorative Justice Paradigm: Restorative
Justice and White-Collar Crime, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 421, 428-29 (2007) (defining
white-collar crime as a "non-violent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception by
persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semi-professional and utilizing
their special occupational skills and opportunities"); see also Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra
note 9, at 8 (noting that "economic crimes comprise between one-fifth and one-quarter of all federal
sentencings").
38. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1. 1(2000).
39. Id. § 2B 1.3 (2000).
40. Id. §2FI.1 (2000).
41. Id. § 2F1.2 cmt. background (2000).
42. Id. app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
43. Id.
44. Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 24.
[Vol. 87:3
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rate sections was to eliminate unnecessary distinctions between crimes
with significant similarities in both offense and offender characteristics. 45
The three original sections required consulting one of two loss ta-
bles in section 2B1l.1 or 2Fl.1 to calculate the increase in the offense
level based on the criminal conduct.46 Because the outcome under the
two tables was nearly identical, judges and practitioners increasingly
tried to devise a distinction between the two loss tables and their relation
to applicable Guidelines' provisions, frequently leading to a lack of sen-
tencing uniformity.47 Ultimately, faced with a variety of circuit splits on
the interpretation of loss under the various relevant provisions of the
Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission concluded that the two loss ta-
bles were unnecessarily duplicative and in need of reform.48
The Economic Crimes Package resolved the issue of duplicative
loss tables by consolidating the 2B 1.1 and 2F1. I loss tables into a single
loss table, section 2BlI .49 This had three effects: (1) "increasing the
range of losses that correspond to individual increments"; (2) "compress-
ing the table"; and (3) "reducing fact-finding., 50 In so amending the
Guidelines, the Commission recognized that "inasmuch as theft and
fraud offenses are conceptually similar, there is no strong reason to sen-
tence them differently.",51 Thus, uniformity was further built into the Sen-
tencing Guidelines.52
B. The Economic Crime Package and Considerations of Measures of
Culpability
Traced from its traditional basis in English law, wherein the major-
ity of economic crimes were considered a form of property theft, the
culpability of economic crime offenders has been overwhelmingly meas-
ured by "the magnitude and nature of the economic deprivation ' 53 in-
curred by the victim. 54 In his 2001 article on sentencing reforms, Profes-
sor Bowman noted that the factor distinguishing economic crime from
other criminal conduct is its lack of consideration for the "mental state or
of the nature and quality of the act(s) which make up the crime., 55 He
45. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008); see also Rami-
rez, supra note 17, at 378.
46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
47. See id.; see also Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 23-24.
48. See Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 24.
49. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. § I A 1.3 (2008).
53. Bowman, Coping with Loss, supra note 36, at 465.
54. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2BI.1 cmt. background (2000) ('The
value of property stolen plays an important role in determining sentences for theft and other offenses
involving stolen property because it is an indicator of both the harm to the victim and the gain to the
defendant."); Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 16.
55. Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 15.
2010]
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elaborated that although a mens rea (mental culpability) is required in
some form, it is almost always "some variant of an intent to steal, de-
fraud, or otherwise deprive the owner of the use or benefit of his prop-
erty. 56 Professor Bowman thus drew the following conclusion:
The consequence of this pattern of historical development is that
there are a variety of well-developed, long realized statutory guide-
posts for distinguishing between more and less serious crimes against
persons, but only one recognized, commonly codified determinant of
the degrees of seriousness of economic crimes-the value of the thing
stolen.
57
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sheer amount of the loss con-
tinues to serve as a proxy for the economic-crime offender's mens rea
and is thereby the most important factor determining sentence length.58
Where loss is difficult or impossible to determine, the sentencing judge
will look to the gain obtained by the offender as an alternative measure
of his culpability. 59 As such, in the area of economic crimes, loss and
gain are outcome determinative for sentencing purposes.
1. Loss as a Measure of Culpability
Since the Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated, loss findings
were required in over 9,000 cases per year, resulting in significant num-
bers of appeals and "numerous splits of opinion between the federal cir-
cuits." 6 ' The Economic Crime Package of 2001 resolved the calculation
of loss to reinstate uniformity in sentencing.61 The circuit splits on loss
calculation had revolved around two key interpretations-definition and
causation-and it was on these two points of contention that the Sentenc-
ing Commission amended the Guidelines so that the measure of loss
would best represent the offender's true culpability in relation to the se-
riousness of his or her offense.
62
The amended Guidelines provision defined loss as "the greater of
actual and intended loss," where intended loss includes "unlikely or im-
possible losses that are intended, because their inclusion better reflects
the culpability of the offender." 63 The Commission defined actual loss as
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 39.
59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 cmt. n.3 (2008).
60. Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 26.
61. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008). The Economic
Crime Package included revision to the loss calculation in four key reforms: (1) revision of the
common definition of loss; (2) revision to areas of the Guidelines referring to loss; (3) bringing the
Guidelines into technical conformance with the new definition; and (4) amendment to the specific
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"reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm" 64 resulting from the offense,
acknowledging both cause-in-fact ("but for" causation) and a limit on
cause-at-law (legal causation) as what was reasonably foreseeable.
65
Though the Commission was not compelled to amend the timing factor66
based on a circuit split, it anticipated the issue arising and preemptively
addressed it.67 It adopted the net-loss approach, which specifically ex-
cluded certain economic benefits transferred to the victims from incorpo-
ration in the loss calculation when those benefits were transferred after
the time the crime was detected. 68 This reform codified the time of detec-
tion approach, ensuring that benefits transferred to the victim after the
defendant was made aware that his activity had been detected would not
mitigate the amount of the victim's loss used in calculating the sen-
tence.
69
Thus, the Economic Crime Package transformed the way sentencing
is approached in cases of economic-crime offenders. The consolidation
of the theft, property destruction, and fraud sections, as well as their cor-
responding loss tables, acknowledged their historic and current parallels
in both the eyes of the Sentencing Commission and the judicial commu-
nity at large. Moreover, this consolidation reaffirmed the centrality of the
loss calculation in determining an offender's sentence, and improved its
practical application as a proxy for both the seriousness of the criminal
conduct and the offender's mental culpability.
2. Gain as a Measure of Culpability
Though the Sentencing Guidelines weigh heavily towards applica-
tion of the victim's loss as a measure of the offender's culpability, when
ascertainable, 70 both loss and gain are applicable to the same loss table,
section 2B 1.1.71 Section 2B1.1 states that "[t]he court shall use the gain
that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if
64. Id. (noting that reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm is defined as "pecuniary harms that
the defendant knew, or under the circumstances, reasonably should have known, was a potential
result of the offense").
65. Id.; see also Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 42 ("The literature of criminal
law, contracts, and torts usually conceives of causation as having two components, customarily
labeled 'cause-in-fact' and legal cause. Cause-in-fact is about determining the causal relationship
between a defendant's act and a subsequent harm to another. It asks whether the conduct truly was a
part of the chain of events in the physical world that brought about the harm. Legal cause asks a
different question: Assuming that the defendant's conduct truly did play a role in bringing about the
harm, is it just to impose legal liability for the harm concededly caused?") (citations omitted).
66. Infra Part IV.A.3. Timing refers to the point in time at which the court elects to calculate
loss or gain.
67. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
68. Id.
69. Id. (noting that time of detection also includes "about to be detected" to account for situa-
tions where the defendant is cognizant that his criminal conduct is soon to be detected).
70. See Mark D. Harris & Anna G. Kaminska, Defending the White-Collar Cave at Sentenc-
ing, 20 FED. SENT'G. REP. 153, 155 (2008).
71. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 (b)(l) & cmt. n.3 (2008).
2010]
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there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined. 72 Thus, gain as a
measure of culpability arises primarily in the sentencing of insider-
trading offenders (a narrow category of fraud found in section 2B1.4),
because the manipulative and deceptive nature of insider trading makes it
particularly difficult to determine not only the victims of the offense, but
the actual pecuniary loss. 73 Under the Sentencing Guidelines section
2B1.4, an offender's culpability is measured by the "gain resulting from
the offense," specifically, the "total increase in value realized through
trading in securities ' 74 and is to be calculated using the loss table in sec-
tion 2B 1.1i.71
Despite being faced with significant disparity in sentencing calcula-
tion based on loss as a measure of culpability during the 1990s, the Sen-
tencing Commission failed to foresee that a similar dispute would arise
out of interpretation of the gain calculation. In fact, the Economic Crime
Package only addressed gain in a cursory fashion by: (1) retaining the
rule that gain may be used as an alternative to loss when loss is unascer-
tainable but specifying that it may only be used when there is an actual
loss;76 and (2) refusing to expand gain to "situations in which loss can be
determined but the gain is greater than the IOSS. ' 7 7 Substantively, gain as
a measure of culpability did not change from the pre-Economic Crime
Package to post-2001 amendment Sentencing Guidelines. 78 Perhaps the
Commission intended to wait for the issue to arise through the appellate
review process before it attempted to define, address, and remedy the
potential complexity of gain interpretation. Or, conversely, perhaps the
issue was indeed entirely unforeseen. Whatever its regard, because gain
has been deemed an alternative measure of culpability, 79 the Commis-
sion's resolution on the methodology for loss calculation should be a
reasonable basis for analyzing the likely resolution of gain as a measure
of culpability by the Sentencing Commission.
111. THE EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE ISSUE OF GAIN CALCULATION
As a litigated issue, gain calculation likely evaded judicial scrutiny
for two basic reasons. First, the focus of the Sentencing Guidelines in the
area of economic crimes has been the calculation of loss, the mirror im-
age of gain and which has dominated the sentencing of economic
72. Id. § 2B 1.I cmt. n.3.
73. See id. § 2B 1.4 cmt. background.
74. Id. § 2B 1.4(b)(1) & cmt. background (2008).
75. Id. § 2B 1.4(b)(1).
76. Id. app. C, amend. 617 ("[The Guidelines provision] clarifies that there must be a loss for
gain to be considered.").
77. Id. (noting that expanding gain would not be appropriate "because such instances should
occur infrequently, the efficiency of the criminal operation as reflected in the amount of gain ordi-
narily should not determine the penalty level, and the traditional use of loss is generally adequate").
78. Compare id. § 2F1.2(b) (2000), with id. § 2B1.4 cmt. background (2008), and id. § 2B1. 1
cmt. n.3 loss under subsection (b)(l)(B) (2008) (defining "gain" for sentencing purposes).
79. See id. § 2B .I cmt. n.3 (2008).
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crimes.80 Second, the calculation is primarily used in cases of sophisti-
cated fraud, a defacto subcategory of crimes in which "the victims and
their losses are difficult if not impossible to identify."'8' These cases are
highly complex, have a significant stigmatic affect on their high profile
offenders, and until recently, were rarely prosecuted due to their com-
plexity.82 Though insider trading83 is a highly visible offense, frequently
appearing in the news media, there is little case law on the subject re-
garding relevant sentencing considerations. Given the high profile white-
collar crimes of recent years and the federal government's hard-line on
prosecutions and sentencing, 84 the employment of gain as a measure of
culpability is likely to become more prevalent in criminal sentencing
law.
A. United States v. Mooney
In 2005, Mooney emerged from the Eight Circuit as the first case to
challenge the specific calculation methodology for gain under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines economic-crime provisions. 85 The case involved the
80. See id. app. C, amend. 617.
81. Id. § 2B1.4 cmt. background. Though not officially defined in the Sentencing Guidelines,
sophisticated fraud appears to primarily refer to insider trading (as it is only listed in this section of
the Guidelines), but it may cover other frauds as well. The background commentary to § 2B1.4 states
"[c]ertain other offenses, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 13(e), that involve misuse of inside information for per-
sonal gain also appropriately may be covered by this guideline." Additionally, Appendix A of the
Guidelines references 7 U.S.C. § 13(d) and (f), the statute prohibiting insider trading, as correspond-
ing to Guidelines § 2B1.4. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(e) (West 2010) (subsection (f) was re-designated as
subsection (e) in 2008 amendments) and § 13(d) prohibits "[ulse of information by Commissioners
and Commission employees." Therefore, the language of "sophisticated fraud" rather than "insider
trading" is more appropriate in reference to the debacle of gain calculation because the calculation
may apply directly to both insider trading in securities and misuse of Commission information.
Furthermore, the language of the Sentencing Guidelines § 2B 1.1 may further broaden the
application of gain to other yet-unspecified economic crimes. That provision states that "[tihe court
shall use the gain that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if there is a
loss but it reasonably cannot be determined." See id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3. By example, in United States
v. Cherif, a mail and wire fraud case, the court referenced § 2F1.2, the guideline for insider trading,
"[t]o justify using the gain to enhance the base offense level." United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692,
702 (7th Cir. 1991). The court explained that despite Cherif's conviction under mail and wire fraud,
not insider trading specifically, § 2F1.2 permitted use of gain to increase the offense level for "cer-
tain other offenses . . . that involve misuse of inside information for personal gain" Id. (alteration in
original).
82. See generally J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The
Justifications for Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1295
(2005) (discussing white-collar crime as stigmatic because the offenders are public individuals,
problematic to detect because of the level of concealment, and traditionally lightly punished).
Though Dutcher's discussion pertains to white-collar crime prosecution generally, sophisticated
fraud is counted among white-collar crimes.
83. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(e) (West 2010) (stating that insider trading is a felony offense of "will-
fully and knowingly" trading "for such person's own account, or for or on behalf of any other ac-
count" or "disclos[ing] for any purpose inconsistent with performance of such person's official
duties ... any material nonpublic information obtained through special access related to the per-
formance of such duties").
84. Infra Part IV.B.2.a.
85. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Because the federal
sentencing guidelines in effect in 2002 would have resulted in a higher sentencing range for the
amount of gain found to have resulted from his offenses, the district court applied the 1994 guide-
lines .... Section 2B1.4, the guideline at issue in this case, is identical in both versions except for
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former vice president of underwriting at United Health Corporation, Mr.
Alan Mooney, who traded stock based on material, nonpublic informa-
tion he received during the course of negotiations arranging for United to
acquire another healthcare services company, Metra.86 Mooney's suspect
transactions included the sale of 20,000 shares of Metra stock on May
17, 1995, which resulted in profits of $775,000; and the purchase of call
options in United stock with the proceeds of his sale of shares at the price
of $258,283.03. 87 The latter transaction gave Mooney the right to buy
40,000 shares in United. 88 He subsequently sold the call options in July
and October when the stock price had "increased markedly," resulting in
a return of $532,482.49.89
Mooney was formally charged with and convicted of eight counts of
mail fraud, four counts of securities fraud, and five counts of money
laundering. 90 Based on its mandatory consultation of the Sentencing
Guidelines, the district court employed a base level offense of seventeen,
added two levels for knowledge that the proceeds were fraudulently ob-
tained, and added an additional two levels for the significant dollar
amount gained through the transaction. 9 Ultimately, corresponding to
the calculated offense level of twenty-one and a criminal history level of
I, the court imposed a sentence of forty-two months in prison and a
$150,000 fine.92
Mooney appealed his sentence based on the theory that the district
court incorrectly calculated gain by employing the net-gain approach
which overstated his culpability, resulting in over-sentencing. 93 In es-
sence, net gain is calculated by taking the total amount realized from the
trading in securities and subtracting the purchase price of those securi-
ties.94 Mooney's gain, approximated at between $200,000 and $350,000,
had increased his offense level by two levels. 95 The Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's use of the net-gain approach.96 The court found
the plain language of the Guidelines "simple and straightforward, 97 de-
termined that any question of interpretation could be "decisively resolved
by the authoritative definition provided in the commentary to § 2B 1.4, '98
the use of gender neutral language in 2002, and Mooney does not challenge the court's use of the
1994 manual.").
86. Id. at 1095-96.
87. Id. at 1096.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1097.
91. Id. at 1097-98.
92. Id.; see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text; see generally U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2008).
93. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1098.
94. See id.; see also United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1068-70 (10th Cir. 2009).
95. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1097-98.
96. Id. at 1101.
97. Id. at 1099.
98. Id.
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and, finally, concluded that net gain promotes a "simple, accurate, and
predictable rule for judges to apply and follows the congressional man-
date that sentences reflect the seriousness of the offense." 99
B. United States v. Nacchio
In 2009, the Tenth Circuit departed from the Eighth Circuit's me-
thod of gain calculation by expressly finding Mooney to be unpersua-
sive. l°° A case of some notoriety in the Tenth Circuit, Nacchio dealt with
the former CEO of Qwest, Inc., Joseph Nacchio, who traded stock in the
company based on undisclosed insider information in a series of transac-
tions in early 2001.10 At the inception of his suspect trading, Mr. Nac-
chio had knowledge that Qwest was heavily reliant on an ill-performing
stream of income, and that the corporation had not made changes in its
revenue streams necessary to meet year-end guidance levels.102 This
nonpublic information became the basis for his informational advantage
as it was undisclosed during the entire period of his suspect trading. 
103
Nacchio's suspect trading occurred in two primary transaction peri-
ods. 104 First, between April 26 and May 15 of 2001, Nacchio exercised
options in his compensation package averaging sales of 105,000 shares
traded per day at an exercise price in the range of $37 to $42 per share.
10 5
His net sale during this period was 1,255,000 shares. 1°6 Second, between
May 15 and May 29, Nacchio sold additional shares in accordance with
an automatic sales plan permitting him to exercise 10,000 options per
day so long as the stock price remained at least $38 per share. 07 Under
this plan, Nacchio sold an additional 75,000 shares before the stock price
dropped below the exercise price.' 0 8 Nacchio's gross proceeds from the
sales in question were approximately fifty-two million dollars. 1°9 Corpo-
rate earnings were eventually released for the second quarter of 2001 on
July 24th, finally disclosing that Qwest was on the low end of its ex-
pected earnings range. 110 Further disclosure on August 14th decreased
target revenues for the remainder of 2001 and for 2002, and both the
99. Id. at 1101.
100. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1069-72 (10th Cir. 2009).
101. Id. at 1064.
102. Id.






109. Id. at 1067-68 ("The parties do not dispute that: Mr. Nacchio's gross proceeds from the
relevant stock sales were $52,007,545.47; the cost of exercising the options was $7,315,000.00; the
brokerage commissions and fees paid were $60,081.09; and the taxes paid were $16,078,147.81 .").
110. Id. at 1066.
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Securities Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice pursued
investigations into Nacchio's trading activities."'
Nacchio was charged with and convicted of nineteen counts of in-
sider trading for the suspect trades." 2 Though his conviction came down
in 2007'13-after the Economic Crime Package amendments of 2001 had
been made to the relevant sections of the Sentencing Guidelines-the
district court sentenced Nacchio under the Guidelines in effect at the
time of the completion of his criminal conduct (May 2001).' 14 Based on
the 2000 version of the Guidelines for insider trading, section 2FI.1,
Nacchio received a base level offense of eight." 15 From the base level, the
court imposed a two level increase due to "abuse of a position of
trust,"' 16 and a sixteen level increase due to the amount of financial "gain
resulting from the offense," '" 7 ultimately arriving at an offense level of
twenty-six. 118 The district court's final sentence imposed (1) a seventy-
two month term of imprisonment for each of the nineteen counts of in-
sider trading, served concurrently; (2) two years probation for each
count, also served concurrently; and (3) a fine of nineteen million dol-
lars.' 19
Nacchio appealed his sentence based on the premise that the district
court incorrectly calculated the "gain resulting from the offense" by em-
ploying the net gain approach from Mooney. 20 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the district court to em-
ploy a market-absorption approach on remand.121 Principally, the market-
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1064, 1066 (noting that Nacchio was initially indicted on forty-two counts of insider
trading, though only convicted of the nineteen related to the transactions referenced above).
113. United States v. Nacchio, No. 05-cr-00545-EWN, 2007 WL 2221437, at *1 (D. Colo. July
27, 2007).
114. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1066 n.5.
115. Id. at 1067 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F. 1.2(b)(1) (2000)).
116. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1069 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3BI.3
(2000)).
117. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1068-69 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2F1.1 (b)(1)(Q) (2000)).
118. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1069.
119. Id. at 1066.
120. Id. at 1069-70.
121. Id. at 1086-87. On remand, the district court will apply the Sentencing Guidelines in
effect at the time of the commission of Nacchio's offenses as was applied in the first sentencing
hearing. By statute, the court is instructed to apply the Guidelines that "are in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § I B 1. 11 (a) (2009). The Sentencing Guidelines further specify that if use of the Guidelines
in effect on the date of sentencing would violate the ex post facto clause, the Guidelines in effect on
the date of commission of the offense should be employed. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.11 (b)(1) (2009). In Nacchio's case, the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing were
post-Economic Crime Package Guidelines and would have substantially increased both the penalty
and likely prison term for the offenses committed, thus likely implicating an ex post facto issue.
Though the various district court and appellate court opinions neither reference nor discuss an ex
post facto conflict, the earlier Guidelines-the 2000 Guidelines in effect at the time of commission
of the offenses-were likely selected for application to avoid such a conflict.
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absorption approach is calculated by taking the value of the shares when
the insider sold them while in possession of material, non-public infor-
mation, and subtracting their market value "a reasonable time after pub-
lic dissemination of the insider information."'' 22 The Tenth Circuit re-
garded this to be the most appropriate calculation methodology because,
it reasoned, "[g]ain should be calculated as the commentary directs, i.e.,
as 'the total increase in value realized through trading in securities,' but
that calculation is applicable properly only to 'the gain resulting from the
offense' specified in the guideline provision itself."'
' 23
IV. BIFURCATED ANALYSIS OF GAIN AS A MEASURE OF CULPABILITY
Similar to the case of loss calculation, section 2B 1.4 of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines has emerged as problematic because it is difficult to apply
a definition of gain in a way that accounts simultaneously for the seri-
ousness of the offense through the amount of harm done while concur-
rently assessing the relationship between the amount of harm and the
defendant's mental culpability.1 24 The issue of gain thus presents two
The issue of whether the Sentencing Guidelines are subject to ex post facto consideration
is a hotly debated issue in light of Booker. The ex post facto clause of the Constitution states that
"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed," but fails to elaborate upon what is con-
sidered to be an ex post facto law. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.3. At common law, the Supreme Court
case Calder v. Bull specified that the ex post facto clause prohibits application of any law which
would increase the penalty and punishment for an offense committed before the law came into being.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). Further, in Garner v. Jones, the Supreme Court set out what
is now perceived as a two-prong test for ex post facto laws: (1) whether application of the current
law would increase the punishment on its face; and (2) whether its retroactive application would
result in a longer period of incarceration than the earlier law, and specified that the intent of the test
was to determine whether the defendant would be disadvantaged by applying the law in effect at the
time of sentencing. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255 (2000). Though when the Sentencing Guide-
lines were mandatory pre-Booker, the Guidelines were interpreted by the lower courts as being
subject to the ex post facto clause, today there is a split in the circuit courts on whether the ex post
facto clause applies to merely advisory Sentencing Guidelines. See Levy, supra note 20, at 2634
(citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987), a state court case in which the United States Supreme
Court held state sentencing guidelines were subject to the ex post facto clause and the lower courts
interpreted this as sufficiently analogous to Federal Sentencing Guidelines and ex post facto consid-
eration).
The split divides the Seventh Circuit, in which Judge Posner has found that the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines do not implicate ex post facto considerations because advisory guidelines are
not "laws," and principally the Eighth, Sixth, District of Columbia, and First Circuits, all holding
that the ex post facto clause still applies. The Fifth Circuit, rather ambiguously, has stated that it may
favor the Seventh Circuit's interpretation. The issue post-Booker is yet to be considered by the
United States Supreme Court. Compare United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006)
("We conclude that the ex post facto clause should apply only to laws and regulations that bind
rather than advise, a principle well established with reference to parole guidelines whose retroactive
application is challenged under the ex post facto clause."), with United States v. Carter, 490 F.3d
641,643-46 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing ex post facto implications, but finding that the ex postfacto
claim was forfeited), and United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441,446-47 (6th Cir. 2008), and United
States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440,
449 (1st Cir. 2007). But see United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 323-24 (5th Cir.
2007).
122. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1078 (citing SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting
SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1983))).
123. Id. at 1073 (emphasis added).
124. See Bowman, Sentencing Reforms, supra note 9, at 41.
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questions: how should the court sanction the offender for the criminal
conduct; and what sanction is proportionate to his criminal culpability?
Thus far, this Comment has established that the Sentencing Com-
mission intended the economic-crimes provisions of the Sentencing
Guidelines to parallel one another. Moreover, the provisions' internal
references to one another indicated they were intended to complement
each other. The following discussion first contrasts the practicality of the
two prevailing theories of gain calculation by analogizing them to the
loss-calculation methodology employed for sentencing economic crime
offenders. It will be argued that the loss methodology forms a reasonable
basis upon which to postulate future amendment to gain as a measure of
culpability.' 25 Second, each approach's ability to align with the philoso-
phical underpinnings of criminal punishment will be considered as a
threshold inquiry into whether an approach will be adopted through
Guidelines amendment.
The Sentencing Guidelines contain three relevant authorities. First,
the guideline provisions set out the essential information a court will
need in order to impose a sentence. 2 6 Second, each guideline section has
official commentary which provides notes on application of the guideline
provision, its drafting background, and any other considerations which
may be useful to a court in interpreting ambiguous language. 127 Lastly,
each guideline section contains policy statements that give general ex-
planations of the policy leading to the Sentencing Guidelines and how
the Guidelines are to be employed to further the purposes of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act. 2 8 In Stinson v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that the "principle that the Guidelines Manual is binding on federal
courts applies as well to policy statements" and that "commentary re-
garding departures from the Guidelines should be 'treated as the legal
equivalent of a policy statement.""129 Thus, in examining the various
calculation methodologies relevant to section 2B 1.4 gain calculation and
section 2B 1.1 reference to gain, the analysis herein will employ all three
authorities.
A. Plain Language and Commentary: Practical Considerations
Section 2B1.4's limited length and sparse explanation makes analy-
sis of the "gain resulting from the offense" problematic, as there is virtu-
ally no direct indication of its suggested use. 130 By contrast, section
2B1.4's sister section-2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and
125. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
126. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 41 (1993).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 42-43. Note that though the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory, Stinson v.
United States remains good law.
130. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 (2008).
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Fraud)-is extensive, largely due to prior amendment.' 3' Building off of
the commentary132 regarding the reasons for the amendment of loss as a
measure of culpability (which addressed the practical problems of em-
ploying the definition, causation, and timing of loss), the viability of the
two theories of gain calculation are analyzed below.
1. Definition
The net-gain approach put forth by the Eight Circuit in Mooney
strongly emphasizes gain as the "total increase in value realized through
trading in securities.' 33 Beginning with strict statutory construction, the
Eight Circuit stated, "[t]he guideline refers to defendant's gain, not to
market gain, and it ties gain to the defendant's offense... speak[ing] of
gain that has resulted, not of potential gain."'34 By reading gain gener-
ally, as expressed in the Guidelines provision, the court took the ap-
proach that the Commission intended the defendant's gain to be inter-
preted broadly.
2. Causation
As the broader of the two definitions of gain, net gain projects a
predictably wider scope for causation, emphasizing the amount realized
from the illegal activity.' 35 The Eighth Circuit went to great lengths to
establish the definition of "realized" as "well-settled terminology," fi-
nally surmising that "[b]y use of the word realized, the commentary
makes clear that gain is the total profit actually made from a defendant's
illegal securities transactions."' 136 The Eight Circuit chose not to distin-
guish the illegal transaction-what the Tenth Circuit in Nacchio speci-
fied as the disclosure of material, nonpublic information-from the com-
pletely legal activity of trading in general, but rather looked to the entire
trade as a whole. 137 In so doing, the court in Mooney defined gain causa-
tion as the requisite "but for" the trading in securities and did not attempt
to limit its legal causation.
The narrower definition of gain in the market absorption approach
necessitates confining gain causation to but-for, plus a little. The Tenth
Circuit criticized the net-gain approach as "effectively ignor[ing] the
myriad of factors unrelated to [the offender's] criminal fraud that could
have contributed to the increase in value of the securities."' 38 By going
131. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 (2008) with U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.4 (2008).
132. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 46 ("[T]he courts will treat the commentary much like legislative
history or other legal material that helps determine the intent of a drafter.").
133. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1099-1100 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.4 cmt. background (2002)).
134. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1099 (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. Id. at I 100 (emphasis added).
137. Seeid. at llOl.
138. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 2009).
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back to the underlying offense in Nacchio-insider trading-the Tenth
Circuit stated that the gain must be that which occurs during the commis-
sion of the offense, and that the offense ends once the material, nonpub-
lic information becomes public and is absorbed by the market.139 The
court reasoned that, "the underlying value of the share of stock, which is
separable from the deceptive practice accompanying its purchase or sale,
should not be attributed to an inside trader." ' 4° The calculation method-
ology the Tenth Circuit settled on was the value of the shares when the
insider sold them while in possession of material nonpublic information,
minus the market value of the stocks "a reasonable time after public dis-
semination of the inside information.'' In doing so, the court effec-
tively added a limit to legal causation. In footnote thirteen, the court
elaborated that, "the court should consider the volume and price at which
[the] shares were traded following disclosure, insofar as they suggested
the date by which the news had been fully digested and acted upon by
investors.,, 142 Thus, market absorption defines but-for gain causation as
that which is strictly related to the illegality of the transaction and con-
fines legal causation to a "reasonable time after" the material, nonpublic
information goes to market.
When amending gain causation, the Sentencing Commission will,
therefore, have to decide whether to limit the legal causation of "gain
resulting from the offense."'143 A comparable issue when the economic-
crimes provisions were amended in 2001, loss causation centered around
three principle concerns: (1) whether to include "foreseen or unforeseen"
losses;144 (2) whether loss should be limited to the amount of loss in the
taken property; 145 and (3) whether loss should include non-consequential
or simply direct damages.1
46
The resulting amendment specifies that actual loss is the "'reasona-
bly foreseeable pecuniary harm' 147 that resulted from the offense."' 148 The
new definition demands at least factual ("but for") causation 49 and af-
139. See id. at 1073; Mooney, 435 F.3d at 1106 (Bright, J., dissenting) ("The offense is not the
purchase, but the deception.").
140. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1073 n. 1i.
141. Id. at 1078 (citing SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (I st Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added).
142. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1078 n.13 (quoting SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir.
1983)) (alteration in original).
143. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4(b)(l) (2008).
144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008) (citing United States
v. Lopreato, 83 F.3d 571 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995)).
145. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008) (citing United States
v. Marlatt, 24 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 1994)).
146. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008) (citing United States
v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332 (11 th Cir. 1995); United States v. Daddona, 34 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 1993)).
147. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008) (noting that
"'[reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm' is defined as pecuniary harms that the defendant knew
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fected three key changes in regard to legal causation: (1) consequential
damages are excluded from the definition of causation because "reasona-
bly foreseeable" was deemed sufficient for application of the standard;
50
(2) interest and similar costs are excluded, in most cases, 15 1 thereby de-
creasing unnecessary litigation regarding interest;' 52 and (3) costs rea-
sonably incurred by the government or the victims in investigating and
prosecuting the case are also excluded because of their fact-finding bur-
den and the fear that inclusion of such costs would distance loss from its
purpose as a measure of criminal culpability.'53
The market-absorption approach comes nearer to the amended-loss
causation than net gain because it confines legal causation more tightly.
Both gain-causation theories retain the necessary but-for causation,
though they differ once again in their emphasis on the underlying of-
fense. As to legal causation, the market-absorption approach of "reason-
able time after"'154 parallels "reasonably foreseeable"'' 55 in the loss-
causation. "Reasonable time after"' 156 may nonetheless conflict with loss-
causation in that loss was amended to decrease unnecessary litigation
costs in fact-finding. Determining causation under the market-absorption
approach may become fact-intensive and costly to the judicial system-
and parties involved in the litigation-because it requires significant
fact-finding. 57 Therefore, though market-absorption gain causation is
more consistent with the resolution of loss causation because it puts a
limit on legal causation and keeps the measure of culpability highly re-
lated to the criminal conduct, it may nonetheless defeat the purpose of
reducing judicial costs.
3. Timing
Delving deeper into gain causation reveals that the two gain theories
also differ in their determination of the proper time at which to calculate
gain. Net gain uses the time of sale to calculate gain. This is consistent
with net gain as a broad approach to the total profit generally realized by
the offender. "The use of actual sales to calculate gain provides a clear
and coherent bright-line rule, eliminating the need for extensive factfind-
150. Id.
151. Id. (noting that in the rare occasion "in which exclusion of interest will under-punish the
offender," interest may be included).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1078 (10th Cit. 2009).
155. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 cmt. n.3 (2008).
156. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1078.
157. See id. at 1068 n.7 (explaining that expert witness Daniel Fischel prepared an event study
which "looks to how the price of the stock changed after the fraud was disclosed as evidence of the
amount by which it was inflated prior to disclosure" in order to determine the gain specifically
resulting from the trading based on material, nonpublic information); see also id. at 1068 (noting the
State suggests that the expert study is "flawed").
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ing to try to determine when the market has absorbed nonpublic informa-
tion.",5 8
By contrast, the market-absorption approach uses "a reasonable
time after dissemination of the [material nonpublic] information" as the
timeframe to calculate gain.' 59 The reasoning behind this approach is that
the stock has inherent value and its market price will move based on oth-
er factors not related to the disclosure of the inside information., 60 "It is
that illicit, artificially high value [attributable to the nondisclosure of
material, nonpublic information] that should be reflected in gain calcula-
tion, not the underlying value of the stock."'
161
The issue of gain causation, therefore, will also require the Sentenc-
ing Commission to address at what point in time the measure of gain will
be taken. An analogous consideration of loss causation related to timing
reveals that the Economic Crime Package reforms adopted the net-loss
approach, which specifically excluded certain economic benefits trans-
ferred to the victims from incorporation in the loss calculation when
those benefits were transferred after the time of detection of the crime.
1 62
This reform reemphasized the necessary connection between the gravity
of the criminal conduct and the offender's culpability. 63 In conjunction
with net loss, the reform codified the time-of-detection approach, 64 stat-
ing that it was "the most appropriate and least burdensome time for mea-
suring the value of the transferred benefits."' 65 Under the amended
Guidelines, the benefits transferred to the victim after the offender is
made aware that his activity has been detected are not permitted to miti-
gate the amount of loss used in calculating his sentence.' 66
Once again, the timing of gain calculation under the market-
absorption approach is more consistent with timing for the calculation of
loss. Excluding benefits transferred to the victim after the crime is de-
tected in the loss calculation is analogous to the exclusion of market fac-
tors adding to the underlying value of the stock in the gain calculation.
Indeed, both recognize the existence of other factors as beyond the reach
of the offender's conduct so that excluding them more accurately reflects
the offender's culpability.' 67 But, like with the market-absorption causa-
tion, the underlying principle of market-absorption timing may defeat the
goal of codifying the least burdensome approach to measuring culpabil-
158. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1101 (8th Cir. 2005).
159. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1078.
160. See id. at 1076-77.
161. Id. at 1076 (emphasis added).
162. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
163. Id.
164. Id. (noting that time of detection also includes "about to be detected" so as to account for
situations where the defendant is cognizant that his criminal conduct is soon to be detected).
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id.; see also United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 2009).
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ity. Though market absorption clearly emphasizes the culpability of the
offender in calculating gain, it risks requiring courts to employ an un-
wieldy and fact-intensive methodology for finding gain as a measure of
culpability. This is inconsistent with the goals the Sentencing Commis-
sion has in amending the Sentencing Guidelines for practicality pur-
poses. 168
In a strictly statutory reading, market absorption more clearly meets
the practical requirements necessary for amendment of sections 2B 1.4
and 2B 1.1 commentary regarding gain as a measure of culpability. Mar-
ket absorption closely parallels the prior amendment of loss as a measure
of culpability through its definition of gain, and determination of causa-
tion and timing. Yet, market absorption may nonetheless present compli-
cations in execution because its elements of causation and timing may be
burdensome on the criminal justice system. To reconcile these issues
when determining which approach, if either, to codify by amendment,
the Sentencing Commission must look to the larger policy framework of
federal sentencing and criminal punishment.
B. Policy Perspective: Revisiting the Philosophical Framework
The third authority of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Ma-
nual, the policy statements, defines the philosophical framework that
drives the Sentencing Guidelines.' 69 The value of the policy statements is
in their attempt to guide all interpretation of Guidelines provisions to be
consistent with both sentencing policy and the overriding goals and pur-
pose of the criminal justice system, as a sanctioning mechanism for mor-
ally reprehensible behavior. 170 When amending gain as a measure of cul-
pability for the sentencing of economic-crime offenders, the Sentencing
Commission will likely consider: (1) whether the proposed calculation is
consistent with federal sentencing policy; and (2) whether it promotes the
stated goals and purposes of criminal punishment. 171
1. Sentencing Policy: Honesty, Uniformity, and Proportionality
Under the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress set forth three objec-
tives for the Sentencing Commission: (1) create "honesty" by reining in
the discretion of sentencing judges;172 (2) establish "reasonable uniform-
ity" so as to reduce sentence disparity between like offenders; 173 and (3)
create "proportionality" in sentencing, differentiating between the many
168. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.3 (2008).
169. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,41 (1993).
170. See id.
171. Such an analysis would be consistent with the Sentencing Commission's general approach
in establishing the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1AI.3
(2008).
172. Id.; see also Ramirez, supra note 17, at 365.
173. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IAI.3 (2008); see also Ramirez, supra note
17, at 366.
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criminal conducts punishable by federal statute while relating sentence
terms to the specific offender's culpability.174 Today, and since promul-
gation, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines embody these principles.
In the realm of economic crimes, the 2001 Sentencing Guidelines
reforms reinstated uniformity in the sentencing of economic-crime of-
fenders by emphasizing proportionality in sentencing without promulgat-
ing costly, in depth fact-finding. 175 This Comment's analysis of the two
gain calculation methodologies resulted in a clear preference for the
market-absorption approach. This outcome can largely be explained by
looking at which sentencing policy each gain methodology promotes:
uniformity or proportionality.
Market absorption arguably requires intensive fact-finding in order
to attain proportionality in sentencing.' 76 But the Nacchio court flatly
rejected the government's argument that "criminal punishment would
turn on experts hypothesizing 'what ifs"' and that "[g]ain would depend
as much on the expert retained and the guesswork permitted as on actual
conduct."'177 The court asserted that proportionality is the primary aim of
the financial-fraud provisions, that "it is axiomatic that a critical objec-
tive of federal sentencing is the imposition of punishment on the defen-
dant that reflects his or her culpability for the criminal offense.' 78 Con-
sequently, the Tenth Circuit addressed uniformity in sentencing as a sec-
ondary purpose'79:
[T]he greater certainty that presumably would be the product of such
a simplistic approach is not a cardinal objective of federal sentencing
in financial fraud cases. Indeed, the Guidelines expressly contemplate
that sentencing computations in financial fraud cases may involve
some element of imprecision .... Therefore, it stands to reason that,
operating within a wide range of discretion in the financial fraud con-
text, courts likely will arrive at different sentencing outcomes on
roughly similar facts and that, consequently, certainty of result can-
not be a controlling objective of the Guidelines. 1
80
In order to conclude that uniformity is not a goal in financial-fraud
cases, the court drew from the statement in the commentary of section
174. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1AI.3 (2008); see also Ramirez, supra note
17, at 369.
175. Note that honesty was not a large consideration in reforming the loss calculation in 2001
because the Guidelines were, at the time, mandatory. Today, honesty might be a larger consideration
because the Guidelines are now advisory, restoring limited discretion to the sentencing judge. Due to
the continuing restraints of the post-Booker advisory system, the impact of honesty in sentencing
policy goes unconsidered herein.
176. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that market absorp-
tion is "inherently speculative" and would "involve extensive factfinding").
177. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1079 n.14 (10th Cir. 2009); Brief for the United
States at 65, United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-1311).
178. Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 1077 (emphasis added).
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2FI.1 of the 2000 Sentencing Guidelines that loss need only be a "rea-
sonable estimate."' 18 This seems attenuated: though the Sentencing
Commission purposefully included the "reasonable estimate" provision
in the current Sentencing Guidelines, 182 it arguably did so with the intent
of prompting courts to balance the institutional costs incurred by using a
highly-precise calculation that would result in a truly proportionate sen-
tence, against a simpler calculation which may decrease proportionality
for the specific offender, but would promote uniformity in the aggre-
gate. 183
By contrast, the net-gain approach in Mooney may do the opposite:
by favoring a bright-line rule, the Mooney court emphasized uniformity
in sentencing but overlooked the rule's impact on proportionality. One of
the criticisms raised by the dissent in Mooney was that the net-gain ap-
proach results in "unequal sentences for equal crimes."' 184 But, the major-
ity in Mooney argued that "imprecise standards," such as market absorp-
tion's required determination of a reasonable time after dissemination of
material, nonpublic information, "are particularly inappropriate in the
criminal context."
'1 85
As framed by Mooney and Nacchio, the issue is whether the sen-
tencing goals are coextensive or whether there may be a primary goal at
the expense of another. In Mooney, Judge Bright's dissent reminded the
court that in light of Booker, the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines
"was to move the sentencing system in the direction of increased uni-
formity,' a uniformity that consists of 'similar relationships between sen-
tences and real conduct, ' , 186 thus further emphasizing the desire to bal-
ance uniformity and proportionality against one another to achieve the
most judicious result. Though both courts purport to do exactly that, nei-
ther appears to effectively promote both proportionality and uniform-
ity. 187
By favoring a bright-line rule, the Mooney court emphasized uni-
formity across offenders, but overlooked the rule's impact on proportion-
ality for the specific offender. By articulating a cumbersome and fact-
181. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2FI. I cmt. n.9 (2000)).
182. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1.1 cmt. n.3 (2008).
183. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617, at 687-693
(2008), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I Al.3 (2008).
184. United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1106-07 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bright, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1101 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 1107 (Bright, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253
(2005)).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1086 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that the
focus of the court's holding was on "important objectives of federal sentencing-specifically, sen-
tences should reflect the individual criminal culpability of defendants and avoid unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities"); see also Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1101 (stating that its focus "on the increase in
value realized by the defendant's trades provides a simple, accurate, and predictable rule for judges
to apply and follows the congressional mandate that sentences reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense").
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intensive rule, the Nacchio court's market-absorption methodology pro-
moted proportionality for the specific offender over uniformity within
the sentencing system. Is it therefore possible that uniformity and propor-
tionality, because they emphasize different policy goals, are mutually
exclusive? In application, the current theories of calculating gain as a
measure of culpability under section 2B 1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines
suggest that uniformity and proportionality perhaps cannot be coexten-
sively achieved. In reforming the measure, the Sentencing Commission
must consider whether the goals can be balanced or whether it must elect
which goal will become the primary goal, in light of compounding fac-
tors such as the practicality of the terms for calculation and the larger
policy goals of criminal punishment.
2. The Dilemma of the Purpose of Punishment
The current split in calculation methodology for gain as a measure
of culpability evokes two distinctive aspects of criminal justice and pun-
ishment. The first is that criminal punishment has the unique goals of
retribution and deterrence.' 88 The second is that criminal punishment, as
a system, seeks to sanction moral wrongdoing, rather than price it.' 89 The
sentencing phase is arguably the only feasible point at which the
tort/crime distinction can now be implemented by properly emphasizing
both distinguishing aspects of criminal justice. 190 Therefore, the threshold
inquiry into which methodology, if either, should be adopted by the Sen-
tencing Commission when amending financial gain as a measure of cul-
pability is (1) whether the methodology meets the desired retributive and
deterrent effects of criminal punishment, and (2) whether the approach is
pricing or sanctioning in nature.' 9'
a. Retribution and Deterrence
The Sentencing Commission took a modem approach to sentencing
when it wrote the Sentencing Guidelines by specifically emphasizing two
of the stated goals of the Sentencing Reform Act: retribution and deter-
rence. 92 Retribution emphasizes the nature of criminal law and punish-
ment as indicative of the ideals and values of the community. 93 Thus,
under a retributive theory, commission of the crime is a choice by the
offender to do "evil over good" and the offender deserves to be punished
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); see also BOOKER REPORT, supra note 18, at 5.
189. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1548 (1984).
190. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappear-
ing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 (1991).
191. Contra supra note 171.
192. Bowman, Coping with Loss, supra note 36, at 468 (stating that "the fundamental philoso-
phical approach taken by the Guidelines... [is) a virtual abandonment of the rehabilitative or medi-
cal model of sentencing in favor a designedly imprecise amalgam of 'just deserts' retributivism and
utilitarian 'crime control' theories of deterrence and incapacitation"); see also Ramirez, supra note
17, at 371.
193. See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 409.
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for his immorality in disobeying a community standard. 194 Though retri-
bution incorporates recognition of the community mores, it is nonethe-
less a theory of just deserts: that "punishment should be scaled to the
offender's culpability and the resulting harms."'195 Ideally, these two con-
cepts-community mores and just deserts-will align; but, as illustrated
in the instance of economic crimes, they may be much more complex in
reality.
Deterrence, on the other hand, "serves to prevent future harm" by
discouraging both the specific offender from recidivism and the commu-
nity, generally, from pursuing similar conduct. 196 Punishment by deter-
rence directs conformity of individual conduct within the bounds of the
law. 197 Though traditional theorists would argue that retribution and de-
terrence theories may be mutually exclusive, the Sentencing Commission
has stated that the Sentencing Guidelines execute both, and that the
choice between retribution and deterrence "was unnecessary because in
most sentencing decisions the application of either philosophy will pro-
duce the same or similar results."198 Thus, taken together, both theories
punish nonconformance with the moral standards set by society at
large.199
When the Sentencing Commission overhauled the economic crime
sentencing provisions in 2001, it considered the current community per-
ception of the morality of white-collar crime offenders to determine if
the current state of the Guidelines reflected community standards. 200 The
1990s and early 2000s bore witness to numerous high-profile, high-dollar
frauds committed by white-collar corporate offenders, drawing attention
to the reality that most white-collar offenders received only minimum
penalties and were frequently given probation rather than a prison sen-
201tence. Public outcry progressively encouraged the trend of not only
white-collar offenders receiving prison terms, but longer ones. °2 Con-
cluding that there was still a disconnect between current sentencing of
194. Id. at 409.
195. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.3 (2009).
196. J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications for
Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1295, 1303-04
(2005).
197. Id. at 1304.
198. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.3 (2008) (noting that the Sentencing
Commission references "just deserts" (retribution) and "crime control" (deterrence)).
199. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1360 (1991) (stating that "criminal proceedings are special and different because they
serve as 'affirmation[s] of shared moral purpose"') (alteration in original).
200. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
201. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 557; see also Ramirez, supra note 17, at 380
('The Economic Crime Package illustrates the Sentencing Commission's continued willingness to
move sentencing of high-dollar economic criminal offenses toward more severe terms of imprison-
ment.").
202. Gabbay, supra note 37, at 435.
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white-collar crime offenders and society's perception of their culpability,
the Economic Crime Package universally increased penalties for eco-
nomic-crime offenders.2 °3 Specifically, the reforms amended the loss
table to create substantially higher penalties when moderate to high loss
amounts were incurred.204 With additional reform to white-collar crime
punishment through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enacted in 2002,205 the
trend has been sustained. 206 Furthermore, despite the post-Booker Guide-
lines' advisory nature and return of more of the discretionary role of sen-
tencing judges-a development welcomed by defense attorneys who
hoped it would be a mechanism for reversing the trend of longer prison
sentences-the average sentence term for white-collar offenders has con-
tinued to increase.
207
In the instance of economic crimes, retribution addresses the fact
that the sophisticated-fraud offender must be made more accountable to
society at large for his gain in violation of the community mores because
neither the specific victims, nor their loss, are easily identifiable. 20 8 Giv-
en the realignment of sentencing for economic-crime offenders and pub-
lic perception of the immorality of economic-criminal offenses, net
gain-not market absorption-appears to be most consistent with the
objectives of retribution. But, the retributive concept of just deserts sug-
gests, conversely, that market absorption better implements retribution
because it exacts a more proportionate punishment. This conclusion
clearly indicates that dependent on the desired retributive effect, either
theory may suffice.
Net gain fits the retributive purpose of criminal justice because it
accounts for society's growing perception that white-collar crime is mor-
ally reprehensible and should be punished more severely. In her article
on punishing economic-crime offenders, Professor Ramirez notes that
"[t]hose offenders whom society has welcomed into its personal or fi-
nancial affairs based upon the faqade of respectability and trustworthi-
ness projected by the offenders seem the most culpable under a system of
retribution" because they are educated, intelligent offenders situated eco-
nomically so that the decision to take criminal conduct is truly a
203. Id. at 436-38 ("[A] national survey on white-collar crime conducted during 1999 found 'a
serious confidence gap between public demand for 'just deserts' for white-collar offenders and the
perception of the criminal justice system's ability, or willingness, to administer adequate punish-
ment.").
204. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2008).
205. Gabbay, supra note 37, at 438-39 (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act "directed the
Sentencing Commission to amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines so that they 'reflect the serious
nature of the offenses and the penalties set forth in this Act' in order to 'deter, prevent and punish
such offenses').
206. Harris & Kaminska, supra note 70, at 154 (stating that between 2003 and 2007, the sen-
tences of economic crime offenders on average "increased from 22.4 months to 26.2 months and the
median from 15 to 18 months," with fraud offenders experiencing increases from 14.4 months to 19
months).
207. Id. at 155; see also BOOKER REPORT, supra note 18, at 46.
208. See Bowman, Coping with Loss, supra note 36, at 501, 509.
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choice. 2°9 Net gain's more global approach to uniform punishment,
though tending to increase sentence length because it eliminates finding
costly factual distinctions between like offenders, better actuates the re-
tributive purpose of criminal punishment as "enhanc[ing] the criminal
law's moral credibility" and not undermining the community's percep-
tion of the required means of justice in white-collar crimes. 2'0 Therefore,
the fact that net gain does not promote proportionality for specific of-
fenders (such as just deserts may require) is overcome by its ability to
reflect societal contempt for white-collar crime.
By contrast, market absorption may lose sight of the trend to in-
crease punishments for economic-crime offenders because, by scrutiniz-
ing the exact transaction resulting in gain, final determination of the of-
fender's gain for sentence calculation purposes may in fact be distinctly
different form his perceived moral culpability in society. In Nacchio, the
Tenth Circuit drew significantly on civil law cases and their remedies
because market-absorption approach comes from the civil remedy of
disgorgement. 21 But it has been noted that "criminal and civil law most
clearly diverge when the goal is to exact a penalty capable of expressing
,,212condemnation-commonly termed retribution. Market absorption
clearly reflects this conclusion because, by narrowing the gain calcula-
tion and limiting it to just the illegal transaction, the gain calculation's
punitive potential as "a penalty solely to punish" is diminished.21 3 Con-
clusively, market absorption's emphasis on the proportionality of the
sentence demonstrates just deserts, but it is that exactness in executing
the calculation which may diminish market absorption's retributive ca-
pacity in light of societal mores.
Likewise, net gain better exemplifies the deterrent purpose of crim-
inal punishment. Similar to findings in retribution theory, deterrence
theory has recognized that white-collar crime is generally not committed
out of necessity.214 It is thus widely accepted that punishment of white-
collar crime offenders is most effective as a general deterrent, rather than
a specific deterrent.21 5 The purpose of punishment as a general deterrent
in the instance of white-collar offenders pushes for "substantial prison
terms and . . . financial penalties . . . more severe than [the offenders']
209. Ramirez, supra note 17, at 410.
210. Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 201,213 (1996).
211. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Dura Pharm. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005); United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 93 n. 11 (2d Cir. 2008);
United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cit. 2007); United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110,
128 (2d Cir. 2006); SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 52-55 (1st Cir. 1983)).
212. Cheh, supra note 199, at 1355.
213. Id. at 1357.
214. Ramirez, supra note 17, at 417.
215. See id.
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economic gains, forcing offenders to dip into their savings to reimburse
those they cheated" 216 because:
White-collar crime is difficult to detect, time-consuming to investi-
gate, and costly to prosecute, all resulting in less certainty of punish-
ment.... [Liow rates of imprisonment or meager terms ... under-
mine the message of deterrence directed at those who willingly and
knowingly have participated in similar activities but were not crimi-
nally charged.
217
Net gain emphasizes general deterrence because it achieves the re-
sult of a higher sentence and fine through looking at the general culpabil-
ity of the offender and not getting bogged down in the details of his spe-
cific transaction(s).
By contrast, market absorption likely applies more of a specific de-
terrent effect, and a low one at that, because the offender's sentence is
compounded strictly by the gain that he personally obtained from his
illegal transaction. Furthermore, it may not even achieve specific deter-
rence, because gain calculation under market absorption may only com-
municate to the offender "that society has been wronged" and "that he
must pay," much like measures of liability exact a remedy, and less like
punishment imposes a sanction.218 Arguably, this does not send a mes-
sage to the community that sophisticated-fraud offenders will be pun-
ished "more severe[ly] than their economic gains, '' 219 and thus under-
mines the goal of punishing white-collar offenders to achieve general
deterrence.
Given prior amendment to loss as a measure of culpability through
the Economic Crimes Package-which substantially increased penalties
for relevant offenders as a response to public outcry-the Commission
will likely emphasize the community perception of white-collar crime
and the ability of a sentence to deter sophisticated fraud generally, rather
than specifically. Net gain executes retribution in light of the fact that
sophisticated frauds are crimes in which the offender must answer to
society at large-which has increasingly deemed white-collar crime mo-
rally reprehensible and deserving of more stringent punishment-and
properly emphasizes the purpose of punishing white-collar crime for its
general deterrent effect. Net gain is most consistent with the observation
that "the criminal law threatens the defendant with a much sharper, more
discontinuous jump in the costs that the defendant will incur for [his]
violation than does tort law, because the criminal law has little reason to
216. Dutcher, supra note 196, at 1308.
217. Ramirez, supra note 17, at 415.
218. Id. at 416 ("[T]he offender must not be told simply that society has been wronged and that
the offender must pay, but rather that the offender is the wrongdoer and will suffer dire conse-
quences if such course of criminal action is pursued.") (emphasis added).
219. Dutcher, supra note 196, at 1308.
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fear overdeterrence [sic] (that is, the chilling of socially valuable behav-
ior) within its appropriate domain. 22°
b. The Necessary Distinction Between Tort and Crime
The essential division between tort and criminal law "has been a
hallmark of English and American jurisprudence for hundreds of
years., 22' The two systems have largely functioned in tandem, but with
the distinction that criminal law "prefers to deal in moral absolutes, 2 2
signaling violation of a societal norm, while tort law seeks to measure
liability of a wrongdoer, but does not outright condemn the offender for
his action.223 Though in recent years there has been a significant blurring
of the tort/crime line,224 the trend has not made the distinction irrele-
vant.225 Rather, it has been suggested that the role of the Sentencing
Commission in promulgating sentencing guidelines is to reinvigorate the
tort/crime distinction which has been blurred or overlooked by lawmak-
ers.
226
In academia, a renewed emphasis on distinguishing tort from crime
has focused on the essential distinction of pricing conduct in tort law and
sanctioning commission of a criminal offense. In his article Pricing and
Sanctioning, Professor Cooter defines "a price as a money extracted for
doing what is permitted" to require individuals to take into account the
"external costs of their acts," while "a sanction [is] a detriment imposed
for doing what is forbidden. 227 He proposes that in making a determina-
tion whether to impose a price or a sanction, the following should be
observed:
If lawmakers can identify socially desirable behavior, but are prone
to error in assessing the cost of deviations from it, then sanctions are
preferable to prices .... [Ihf officials can accurately measure the ex-
ternal cost of behavior, but cannot accurately identify the socially de-
sirable level of it, then prices are preferable to sanctions.
228
Pricing, therefore, indicates that the offender/tortfeasor could rea-
sonably weigh the external costs of his conduct against its benefits before
committing the offense, thereby making the price imposed a reasonable
220. Coffee, supra note 190, at 195.
221. Cheh, supra note 199, at 1325.
222. Coffee, supra note 190, at 225.
223. Robinson, supra note 210, at 206.
224. See Cheh, supra note 199, at 1325, 1332.
225. See Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REv. 741, 758 (1993); see
also Coffee, supra note 190, at 222 (Through discussion of Judge Posner's and Judge Calabresi's
position that both tort and criminal law are means of capturing externalities for allocative efficiency
purposes, Coffee indicates that even prominent economic law scholars still believe there is a neces-
sary distinction between tort and criminal law.).
226. Coffee, supra note 190, at 196, 201.
227. Cooter, supra note 189, at 1523.
228. Id. at 1524.
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means to deter commission of the conduct. By contrast, sanctioning con-
duct would indicate either that the costs are incapable of being identified
accurately, or that the conduct is deemed inappropriate for a cost/benefit
analysis because the goal is to deter any commission of the offense-not
just commission of the offense only when it is above a certain cost pre-
mium.
Historically, economic crimes were a form of property theft and
thus the value of the thing stolen was the primary factor in determining
punishment. 229 In such an instance, the loss to the victim could reasona-
bly be considered an externality of the commission of the crime. Where
the victims and their losses were indeterminate, it would be accurate to
suggest that the externality-the loss to society-was too great to calcu-
late, so gain to the offender would be assessed instead. Thus, economic
crimes have always, to a certain extent, blurred the line between tort-
which would award compensation for the thing stolen (the victim's
loss)-and crime-which would punish commission of the theft itself.
Today, the Sentencing Guidelines, comprised of methodical, arithmetic
calculations which incorporate the value of the victim's loss or of-
fender's gain into determination of the economic-crime offender's sen-
tence, reinforce the overlap to a certain extent by retaining the calcula-
tion of externalities of the criminal conduct in the assessment of the of-
fender's sentence. Nonetheless, criminal sentencing, as a function of the
criminal justice system, has the underlying purpose of sanctioning mor-
ally reprehensible behavior and deterring its commission. 230 Thus, the
area of economic crimes implicates a potential conflict between pricing
and sanctioning at the sentencing stage.
For the specific case of insider trading, Professor Coffee has recog-
nized that the origin of the offense-and indeed its retention as a civil
tort-complicates its distinction today as a crime.
At some point, a civil standard can become so deeply rooted and in-
ternalized within an industry or professional community that its vio-
lation becomes blameworthy, even if it was not originally so. Insider
trading may supply such an example, where the norm has long since
become internalized within the industry. The relationship of the civil
and criminal law here is sequentially interactive: the civil law ex-
periments with a standard, but at some point it may 'harden' into a
community standard that the criminal law can enforce. At that point,
it may be appropriate to prohibit, rather than price, at least if society
believes that the defendant's conduct lacks any colorable social util-
ity.
2 3 1
229. Supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
230. See Cooter, supra note 189, at 1549.
231. Coffee, supra note 190, at 201.
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Thus, in using gain as a measure of culpability, the issue is whether
it is appropriate to adopt a tort law calculation methodology in criminal
sentencing determination precisely because there is an experienced for-
232mula employed in analogous tort liability cases, even when doing so
would put at risk the tort/crime distinction underlying the American legal
system. 33 The analysis of net gain and market absorption in the sections
that follow centers around each methodology's nature as a pricing or
sanctioning mechanism in order to determine whether either is appropri-
ate for adoption into the Sentencing Guidelines.
The net-gain approach proposed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Mooney exemplifies sanctioning because "for behavior that soci-
ety wishes to prohibit, a deliberately sharp and discontinuous jump
should be structured into the sentencing guidelines." 234 Through com-
parison to the loss calculation, it was evidenced that net gain takes a
broad definition of gain, employs virtually no limit on causation, and
calculates gain at the time of sale. Although the Tenth Circuit criticized
this approach by stating that net gain overstated the gain, thereby leading
to over-sentencing, the Eighth Circuit court asserted that "[t]he public
interest that is served by sentencing criminal defendants has broader
goals" than limiting the penalty to disgorgement of the exact gain ob-
tained from the illegal transaction.235
The theory of criminal punishment as a sanctioning mechanism spe-
cifically characterizes an "upwardly biased penalt[y] that seek[s] to 'pro-
hibit' rather than 'price.' '' 236 Net gain is consistent with this approach and
moreover, is consistent with the supposition that in sanctioning, "[i]t is
not essential that the sanction equal the harm caused by the act .... It is
only essential that the sanction be large enough so that his [or her] pri-
vate costs are minimized by conforming to the legal standard.2 37 In
sanctioning, "the critical determination is not the price to set, but the
standard of conduct to mandate, because behavior will be extremely
responsive to even a small change in a legal standard that is backed by a
232. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1079 (2009) (citing United States v. Mooney,
425 F.3d 1093, 1107 n. 11 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bright, J., dissenting)).
233. See generally Cooter, supra note 189. Cooter suggests that "economists tend to view law
as a set of official prices" while legal scholars tend to view "law as a set of obligations backed by
sanctions," both blindly ignoring the utility of the other. He argues that the behavioral effect of
punishment differs depending on whether the reprehensible behavior is sanctioned or priced. His
analysis is based on the principle that traditionally, civil liability has employed pricing mechanisms
because the intended effect is for the potential offender to perform a cost/benefit analysis, while
criminal liability is perceived as requiring a sanctioning mechanism because it seeks to prohibit
certain behaviors.
234. Coffee, supra note 190, at 242.
235. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1099.
236. Parker, supra note 225, at 746.
237. Cooter, supra note 189, at 1527.
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highly punitive sanction, '238 thereby increasing the general deterrent
effect.
239
With the goal of reducing costs of both enforcing and prosecuting
the law, net gain as a sanctioning mechanism is most appropriate for
gain-calculation methodology because sanctioning is required where
lawmakers "have better information about community standards than
about external costs." 240 Gain as a measure of criminal culpability is spe-
cifically used in the instance of sophisticated fraud where the victim and
the victim's losses-characterized as external costs-are indetermi-
nate. 241 Sanctioning of sophisticated-fraud offenders is thus preferable to
prices because the loss is unknown and the precise gain is fact-intensive
and time consuming to determine.242 Furthermore, increasing the sanc-
tion is "virtually costless and is extremely flexible '243 for the judicial
system because it does not require committing additional funds to law
enforcement for detecting these highly evasive criminals, nor does it
require judges to ponderously scrutinize the facts in order to determine
with complete precision the amount of gain attributable to the criminal
conduct.
In recent years economic analysts have acknowledged "that social
policy may safely assume that gain is always less than harm, that there is
no surrounding productive behavior to be overdeterred, or that it is im-
possible to overdeter an activity whose optimal level is zero. ' 244 This
supports using the net-gain calculation because it "deemphasize[s] con-
cerns about the adverse welfare effects of overly punitive penalties.,
245
Net gain emphasizes the harm done to society and does not overly-
consider the impact of the punishment on the defendant, as might be
more appropriate when finding tortfeasor liability. 246 Hence, sanctioning
the offender through net gain does not overemphasize the potential to
over-sentence at the expense of under-deterring criminal conduct whose
optimal level is nil.247
238. Coffee, supra note 190, at 226 (emphasis added).
239. THOMAS S. ULEN, The Economic Case for Corporate Criminal Sanctioning, in DEBATING
CORPORATE CRIME 119, 127 (William S. Lofquist et al. eds., 1997).
240. Cooter, supra note 189, at 1549.
241. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B I. I cmt. n.3 (2008).
242. Compare United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 2005), with United
States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1068-69 (10th Cir. 2009).
243. ULEN, supra note 239, at 128.
244. Parker, supra note 225, at 760.
245. Id. at 759.
246. Compare Mooney, 425 F.3d at I 100, with SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 54 (1st Cir.
1983).
247. See Parker, supra note 225, at 769 ("[Plrecisely determining the parameters of optimal
enforcement is very costly. Therefore, law enforcement institutions have been arranged in such a
manner as to only roughly determine penalty levels, with an upward bias to minimize the possibility
of underdeterrence."); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.4 (2008). The Guide-
lines have a built-in safeguard against overrepresentation of culpability in sentencing calculation by
permitting courts to use downward departures to reduce the sentence. This is reinforced by Booker's
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By contrast, the market-absorption approach proposed by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Nacchio is akin to a pricing mechanism.
With its origins in the tort law remedy of disgorgement, this was inevita-
ble.248 "Disgorgement is an equitable remedy designed to deter future
violations of the securities laws and to deprive defendants of the pro-
ceeds of their wrongful conduct., 249 It is traditionally employed for un-
just enrichment and "the remedy is remedial, not punitive, and.., a court
may only order that the defendants restore, with interest, the amount of
their profit. 250 In Mooney, the Eighth Circuit specifically noted that
"[t]his theory of recovery has been characterized as solely remedial in
nature in contrast to criminal punishment., 251 Hence, market absorption
based on disgorgement, when employed in the criminal context, prices
the violation at the expense of not fully sanctioning its commission.
Pricing criminal conduct presents several complications in light of
criminal punishment goals. First, pricing systems do not reinforce socie-
tal mores because they do not underline the offense as prohibited; they
emphasis only the liability derived from the conduct.252 Second, civil
remedies emphasize the quantum of the remedy, not the quality, and
therefore "embod[y] elaborate and fairly rigorous fact-finding procedures
to determine the amount of damages to compensate. 253 Third, rather
than deterring criminal conduct entirely, pricing instigates a cost-benefit
analysis at the margin, meaning that in a pricing system, "behavior is
more elastic. 254 The second and the third implications reinforce each
other: "[s]ince individuals are responsive to the magnitude of the price
and the frequency of its collection, accuracy is crucial to induce behavior
that is efficient or otherwise desirable. 255
Because it is a pricing mechanism, the market-absorption approach
may be ill-suited to the criminal context, regardless of its ability to pro-
mote proportionality in sentencing. As noted by the Eighth Circuit in
Mooney, using a tort remedy is unsupported "in judicial decisions for
incorporating a civil law standard into the interpretation of a sentencing
guideline., 256 The unprecedented use of a "close-fitting civil ana-
log[y] ' '257 such as market absorption from disgorgement to achieve the
limited restoration of judicial discretion in sentencing through making the Guidelines advisory.
Thus, the risk of over-deterrence through overrepresentation of culpability in gain calculation may
be further discounted.
248. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 2009).
249. 69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation-Federal § 1616 (2009).
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1098 (emphasis added).
252. See Coffee, supra note 190, at 225.
253. Parker, supra note 225, at 756 (noting that, by contrast, "criminal sentencing decisions are
more rough-hewn and are avowedly punitive").
254. Cooter, supra note 189, at 1531.
255. Id. at 1532.
256. Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1101.
257. United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1079 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Mooney, 425 F.3d
at 1107 n.I I (Bright, J., dissenting)).
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sentencing result has remarkable implications for federal sentencing,
several of which may not be consistent with the goals of criminal pun-
ishment. Market absorption uses "a reasonable time after public dissemi-
nation" of the material, nonpublic information as legal causation.258 In
the criminal context filled with moral absolutes where the optimal level
of prohibited conduct is zero, bright-line rules are exceedingly more ef-
fective in obtaining a deterrent effect than such "fuzzy standards" as
market absorption's causation standard.259 Moreover, "[i]t is very diffi-
cult to compute the cost of crime to its victims, so large errors would
occur [under a market absorption approach]. Thus the information re-
quirements of pricing crime are prohibitive, while the information re-
quirements for sanctioning crimes are relatively low.''26° Market absorp-
tion may not be practical because it is an unwieldy calculation, which
becomes expensive and time-consuming. Though still punitive-the re-
sulting numeric value is inserted into the sentencing table for computa-
tion into a prison term-market absorption risks the necessary distinction
between tort and crime by deemphasizing the sanctioning function of
criminal law. The underlying ineffectiveness of deterring morally repre-
hensible criminal conduct in a pricing system by implicating a
cost/benefit analysis by the offender rather than outright deterrence may
make the market-absorption approach inconsistent with federal-
sentencing policy and the goals of criminal punishment.
c. Amending Gain as a Measure of Culpability
The guidelines will not please those who wish the Commission to
adopt a single philosophical theory and then work deductively to es-
tablish a simple and perfect set of categorizations and distinctions.
The guidelines may prove acceptable, however, to those who seek
more modest, incremental improvements in the status quo, who be-
lieve the best is often the enemy of the good, and who recognize that
these guidelines are, as the Act contemplates, but the first step in an
evolutionary process.261
Conclusively, from a policy perspective, market absorption's preci-
sion in calculation is the downfall of its employment in criminal sophis-
ticated-fraud cases. In comparison to loss calculation, market absorption
met the criteria set out by the Sentencing Commission in the 2001
Amendment; however, its emphasis on the underlying offense and nar-
row calculation of gain directly resulting from that offense reduced both
its deterrent effect and potential to exact retribution. From its origins in
tort law's disgorgement remedy, market absorption is unavoidably pric-
ing in nature. In so doing, it defeats the purposes of creating a workable
258. Id. at 1078 (citing SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004)).
259. See Coffee, supra note 190, at 226.
260. Cooter, supra note 189, at 1550.
261. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA1.3 (2008).
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calculation methodology that is not cost prohibitive and appropriately
sanctions moral wrongdoing. Its adoption into the Sentencing Guidelines
through amendment by the Sentencing Commission would potentially
disregard the recent trend toward increasing punishment of economic
offenders through sanctions cognizant of the prohibitive nature of insider
trading and similar sophisticated frauds as federal criminal offenses.
The alternative approach, net gain, likewise falls short of the requi-
site for codification into the Sentencing Guidelines by amendment.
Though net gain meets the policy objectives of retribution and general
deterrence through sanctioning criminal conduct without an unnecessary
fear of over-deterrence, the approach lacks the definition and causation
specifications of a comprehensive calculation methodology preferred by
the Sentencing Commission. In sum, as two divergent methodologies
emphasizing different practical and policy considerations, neither the
market-absorption approach, nor the net-gain approach fully satisfies the
stated requirements of a measure of culpability for sentencing purposes.
Thus, in amending the Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission must reconcile the divergent approaches to calculating gain
as a measure of culpability by promulgating a hybrid calculation meth-
odology which meets the following three goals: First, the new gain calcu-
lation methodology must balance the goals (inasmuch as is possible) of
promoting uniformity and proportionality when determining the appro-
priate definition, causation, and timing for practical application of gain as
a measure of culpability. Second, the Sentencing Commission must keep
in mind the overriding trend of increasing penalties for white-collar of-
fenders by imposing a sanction likely beyond the precise ill-gotten gains
in order to ensure sufficient retribution and a general deterrent effect.
Finally, the new calculation methodology need not emphasize precision
in calculation at the detriment of imposing costly fact-finding on the sen-
tencing courts; rather, it must recognize that criminal law deals in "moral
absolutes' 262 and is willing to make "upwardly biased penalties"2 63 when
sanctioning offenders. Accordingly, the Sentencing Commission will
effectively amend gain as a measure of culpability in the sentencing of
sophisticated-fraud offenders.
CONCLUSION
United States v. Nacchio presents the unusual occasion to consider
the complementary roles of the federal appellate courts in identifying
inadequacies in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing
Commission's role in resolving circuit splits on provision interpretation.
Through the lens of Mooney and Nacchio, the appellate courts have iden-
tified the limitations of the current gain calculation in section 2B 1.4 of
262. Coffee, supra note 190, at 225.
263. Parker, supra note 225, at 746.
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the Sentencing Guidelines. Though they number only two at present,
these cases are merely the beginning of a line of cases that will likely
appear across the federal circuits, highlighting the current inadequacy of
gain as a measure of culpability in cases of sophisticated fraud. The
emergence of these cases will be slow, but the relatively infrequent oc-
currence of challenges to section 2B 1.4 gain calculation should not dis-
count its evident need for reform.26
Federal Sentencing Guidelines section 2B1.4 gain calculation meth-
odology currently lacks specificity and clarity. In its current statutory
form, gain calculation methodology defies precise definition and proper
determination of the elements of causation and timing. In looking to re-
cent criminal case law on the issue of interpretation, neither the net-gain
approach nor the market-absorption approach comprehensively calculate
gain as a measure of culpability for sophisticated-fraud offenders. While
the market-absorption approach to the interpretation of 2B 1.4 appears to
be most consistent with the practical construction of the amended-loss
calculation for similarly categorized economic crimes, it falls short of the
sentencing reform goal of balancing proportionality and uniformity with
the punitive nature of the federal felony offenses of insider trading and
other sophisticated frauds. Furthermore, market absorption's historic
roots as an equitable remedy in tort law reveals its true nature as a pric-
ing mechanism, thus its employment in criminal law risks underempha-
sizing the sanctioning of morally reprehensible conduct and may ineffec-
tively deter criminal activity, both of which are central objectives of
criminal punishment.
Amendment of section 2B 1.4 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
is a requisite to the proper execution of gain as a measure of culpability
in cases of sophisticated fraud. That amendment must contain a new hy-
brid-calculation methodology in order to satisfy both the practical appli-
cation needs of gain calculation and the policy objectives of federal sen-
tencing and criminal punishment.
Nicole Black*
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